Technics and (the end of?) Time: A Response to Stiegler's Technics and Time, 1

If there is a teleology of technics that is not a human process (72), then we must redefine the meaning of organic and inorganic (76).

This redefinition is the necessary counterpart to the anticipation that is a "dynamic proper to the technical object tending toward its concetization" (81).

Either way we are future oriented beings. Either way we will experience anxiety and a concern about time.

If this teleology, if the end of the process of technology, is not a human end, then we need a terminology that will enable our active participation in a material sense. This terminology (technological supplement?) will help us to transform our anticipation into a positive catalyst to a necessary process.

This redefinition would present itself as a blurring of the definition between living and non-living.

Mankind after internal posthetic evolution mounts prosthetic matter (see above). The two states of matter combine to the mutual heightened release of potential energy.

A position that considers particular matter nonliving forgets Heisenberg. Stiegler's position--"The evolution of the 'prosthesis,' not itself living, by which the human is nonetheless defined as a living being, constitutes the reality of the human's evolution, as if, with it, the history of life were to continue by means other than life: this is the paradox of a living being characterized in its forms of life by the nonliving--or by the traces that its life leaves in the nonliving."

We seem to solve the paradox when everything is living, in different states of potential energy reserve. If we have any interest in technology, if we want to resist participation in "culture that has made itself into a system of defense against technics" (66), then we must reconcile the non-human teleology of technics through the application of a more-encompassing system of calling.